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Abstract 
This is exploratory study that aims at examining formal contractual agreements for firms in Tanzania using 
Transaction cost theoretical approach. Transaction cost studies have rarely being done on firms in Africa and 
Tanzania in particular. Sampling frame used is from Tanzania revenue authority records for registered business 
2008-2010. The study is centered on business - to business buyer -seller relations. Primary data were collected from 
buying side of this business relationship. Random sample of n =150 buyers were contacted through telephone calls 
and questionnaire were delivered personally. The response rate was about 65%.  
The findings suggest Transaction cost theoretical framework to be highly consistent with previous findings in 
western setting in spite of using Tanzania as context. However there were some slightly differences which could 
partly be explained by study limitations. This study is limited in terms of not using variables like culture and 
institutions in connection to how they influence this theory. 
Keywords: Formal contractual agreements, Asset specificity, Environmental uncertainty, Buyer dependence    
1. Introduction 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) has been used in connection to resource dependence theory (RDT) and relational 
contracting theory (RCT) to predict types and context of relations. For instance Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) found 
that under conditions of high levels of specific investments, co-marketing alliance partners reduce power imbalances 
through formal contracts. Specific assets involve assets that cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive 
value should contracts be prematurely terminated (Williamson, 1985).A basic premise of TCA is that the risk of 
opportunism creates a need for formalized governance mechanisms such as formal contracts or direct control 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). TCA predicts that exchange relationships with high asset specificity tend to use more 
formal contracts for governance when the transaction cannot be internalized. The extent of formal contractual 
agreement may also be influenced by the uncertainty surrounding the exchange. Such environmental uncertainty 
creates adaptation problems, in the sense that previous agreements need to be renegotiated. While Macneil (1980) 
suggested that environmental uncertainty increases the need for formal contracts, empirical studies have shown 
mixed results. Finally, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) prescribes under which 
circumstances a power-advantage and power-disadvantage exchange partner are motivated and able to establish a 
formal contract.  
Most empirical studies on the antecedent to formal contractual agreements involve large companies from a western 
setting. The objective of the present study is to introduce a new setting by studying supplier-distributor relationship 
in a developing country, and to investigate whether the TCA predictions for formal contractual agreement are valid 
under this context.  
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis 
2.1 Formal contractual agreements. 
Formal contracts are distinct from other forms of contracts due to legal enforcements (Macneil, 1978). Ongoing 
contractual relations create expectations that future exchange will occur in partially predictable patterns, simply 
through the dynamics of the existing relations whether or not hierarchical (Macneil; 1980:8). Formal contracting 
addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive 
alignment. Typically, a formal contract is highly customized to a specific transaction, it is detailed about the 
exchange partners responsibilities and obligations, it is written, and quite often it requires legal work. Formal 
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contracts are partly shaped by how often transaction takes place between independent firms (Ryall and Sampson, 
2009). Relational mechanisms focus on social processes that promote norms of flexibility, solidarity, and 
information exchange (Heide and John, 1994). Without ownership and cross equity involvement, the relationships 
between firms are mostly based on contracts or vertical coordination (Buvik & Haugland, 2005).  
Williamson (1985) noted that parties to an asset-specific exchange have a mutual interest in perfecting the 
contracting relation. The question of contractual agreement with respect to asset specificity is concerned with 
safeguarding. Joskow (1988) noted that the complexity dimension as well as specific asset may increase the use of 
formal contracts. In the same line of thought, Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggested that the more complex the 
contract is, the greater is the specification of promises, obligations, and processes for dispute resolution.There are 
previous studies which have examined contractual agreements and environmental problems (Williamson, 1985; 
Manolis et al, 1997; Leiblein & Miller 2003; Ivens, 2005). Furthermore, dependence has been suggested to impact 
the use of formal contracts (Heide, 1994; Buvik and Reve, 2002). This study will observe these connections but in a 
different setting in terms a developing country, where the cultural, institutional, and business-to-business types of 
relationship may differ from the western countries.  
2.2 Effects of buyer dependency 
Resource dependence theory views inter-firm governance as a strategic response to conditions of uncertainty and 
dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Heide and John (1988) noted that the dependency arising from specific 
assets is unique from other aspects of dependence. When buyer is dependent in the relationship, she/he will have 
less power to enforce the agreements or negotiation with the supplier and this will negatively affect formal 
contractual agreements. These findings are also supported by Buvik and Reve (2002) where they confirmed a strong 
negative effect of buyer dependence on formulation of contractual agreement when buyer has committed specific 
investments in the relation.  
Dependency may, however, also be attributed to other causes than specific assets, for instance when the buyer has no 
or few alternative suppliers of critical resources and/or when the switching costs of changing supplier would be high. 
Under such circumstances, the buyer (as dependent) is likely to prefer a formal contract. This desire is not, however, 
equivalent to the ability to obtain such a contract. The power-advantage organization would then lose part or all of 
its discretion over the allocation of its critical resources to the dependent party. Accordingly, the dominant exchange 
partner (supplier) is not likely to agree on a formal long-term contract (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Thus, we 
hypothesize:  
H1: Buyer dependence has a negative effect on formal contractual agreement. 
2.3 Effect of interaction between buyer asset specificity and buyer dependence 
Williamson (1985) viewed asset specificity to be “durable investments” that are deployed for the facilitation of a 
transaction. This could involve one side of the relationship (unilateral) or both sides (bilateral). Human assets (skills, 
knowledge) as well as physical assets (equipments, buildings) are incuded in this, but the difficulties in 
redeployement has been used to characterize these investments’ specificity (Heide, 1994). While other studies have 
found transactions involving asset specificity to prefer formal contracts (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Lui et al, 2009), 
others have indicated that such a relationship is contingent upond dependence (Buvik & Grønhaug, 2000; Buvik & 
Reve, 2002). We argue that when both buyer asset specificity and buyer dependence are present in a relationship, a 
need for formalize contractual agreement is heightened. Thus we hypothesize: 
H2: When buyer is dependent and he has made specific investment in the relation with supplier, there will be a 
poitive impact on formal contractual agreement.  
2.4 Effects of environmental uncertainty 
Noordewier (1990:8) described the concept of environmental uncertainty as ‘’unanticipated changes in 
circumstances surrounding an exchange’’. Bensaou (1999) on the other hand coined this concept as external 
uncertainty and he defined it as unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange relationship. While 
Bensaou (1999) suggested technological uncertainty as a key component of external uncertainty, Monalis et al. 
(1997) noted market uncertainty and regulatory environmental uncertainty as the key components of external 
environmental uncertainty. When technological uncertainty is high, firms are likely to retain the flexibility to 
terminate relationships and thereby to avoid formal contracting (Geyskens et al., 2006). Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
found a negative association between technological uncertainty and formal contracting. Ivens (2005) agreed on the 
problematic impact of environmental uncertainty in establishing formal contractual agreements. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
H3: Environmental uncertainty has a negative impact on formal contractual agreement. 
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3. Research Methods 
3.1 Research Background 
The empirical context of the study is Tanzanian producer and distributor firms, representing suppliers and buyers 
respectively. The sampling frame was based on Tanzania revenue authority records for registered business of 
2008-2010. Data were collected from distributor (buyer) firms. A random sample of n=150 buyers were contacted by 
phone call, of which n=130 were interested to participate. The questionnaires were delivered personally to the 
distributors. There was opportunity to explain the questions, to ascertain that the respondents were knowledgeable 
about the phenomena under study. The respondents were asked to choose major supplier whom they would use to 
answer the questions. The final sample comprised 97 buyers, of which 87 were early respondents while 10 were late 
respondents. The response rate was about 65%. 
3.2 Sample Characteristics 
25.8% of firms involved from the study were established between 1990- 2000, 73.2% were firms established after 
year 2000, and the rest were established before 1990. With respect to business turnover, 30.9% of firms had an 
annual turnover of up to Tshs 5 million, 55.7% with annual turnover of between 5 to 200 million (exclusive), 12.4 
had annual turnover of between 200 to 800 million (exclusive), and the rest with above 800 million (5 Tshs 
million=20.000 NOK).  
3.3 Measurement 
3.3.1 Formal contractual agreement 
Previous studies have used five items, 7-points likert scale in measuring this construct (Buvik & Reve 2002). This 
study used three items (Table1), 7- points likert scale with “strongly disagree and strong agree” statements. After 
factor analysis (principal component) all items loaded in a single component. Reliability analysis indicated a 
measure of α = 81.5% which is quite above the cutting point (0.6). The findings were confirmed by KMO and 
Bartlett’s test which measured at 0.648 and λ2= 117.283 (significant at p < .001) respectively, implying a very high 
correlation among the measured items.  
3.3.2 Buyer asset specificity 
Muti item scales are used in measuring this concept (Stump and Heide, 1996 Anderson, 1985; Rokklan et al, 2003). 
In this study buyer asset specificity was measured using four item (Table1) in a seven-point likert scale, with 
statements anchored by "strongly disagree" and" strongly agree"(items are listed in table3).  After factor analysis 
(principal component) all factors loaded into one factor. The reliability of this component measured α = 93.35% 
which is very significant. KMO was 0.796 also indicates a satisfactory correlation level of the items which justified 
for factor analysis. Again Bartlett’s test indicated λ2= 501.174 which was significant at p < .001, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the correlation matrix was identity matrix. The buyer asset specificity was abbreviated by term 
BUASP in the analysis. 
3.3.3 Buyer dependence 
Previous studies have measured this concept using muti item scale (Heide, 1994; Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; Buvik 
and Reve, 2002). This study used four items (table 1) in 7-points likert scale with statements anchored “strongly 
disagree” and “strong agree”. After factor analysis the four items loaded in a single component. Further reliability 
analysis indicated α =96.98% which was quite significant. KMO and Bartlett’s test measure at a level of 0.854 and 
λ2 = 507.724 (significant at p < .001) respectively, supporting the idea of high correlation among variables and the 
necessity for proceeding to factor analysis. The concept of buyer dependence is abbreviated by BUDEP in the 
analysis.  
3.3.4 Environmental uncertainty: 
Multi items scales have mostly been used in many studies for this variable (Anderson, 1985, Noordiwier et al, 1990). 
Some items have been used to reflect instability (Anderson, 1985). This study used both items indicating technology 
and volume uncertainty (table1). After factor analysis three items loaded into one component. Further the reliability 
analysis indicated α = 82.78% which is quite significant. KMO and Bartlett’s test measured 0.859 and λ2 = 417.069 
(significant at p < .001) respectively, implying a significant correlation of the terms in measuring the concept. This 
concept in the analysis was abbreviated as ENVU. 
4. Empirical Results  
In order to test the hypotheses, ordinary least square (OLS) regression model was estimated. The regression results 
are shown in Table 2. The overall model fit was quite satisfactory (R2 Adj = .205 F (3, 90) = 5.23; p<.01).  
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Hypothesis1 suggested a negative relationship between buyer dependence (BUDEP) and formal contractual 
agreement (FCA). Table 2 showed that buyer dependence to have a significant negative impact (t=3.75; p=0.01) on 
formal contractual agreement, thus supporting the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted interaction effect between asset specificity and buyer dependence (BUASPXBUDEP) to be 
positive. This hypothesis was supported whith the results from the model in table1 (t=1.801; p=0.037). The results 
of the model in table1 have also shown buyer dependence to have a negative association with formal contractual 
agreement but its interaction with asset specificity cause a positive impact.  
Hypothesis 3 suggested a negative impact of environmental uncertainty on formal contractual agreement. Results 
from model in table 1 indicated a negative effect (t= -1.05; p = 0.15). Though the sign was consistent as predicted, 
the result was not significant. This implies a partial support for this hypothesis.  
Correlation matrix from tabe3 does not indicate any problem of multicollinearity which suggests that the results are 
not affected by strong close association among the variables. The model in table2 has included other interaction 
variables so as to find out whether they have any significant influence on dependent variable.   
Summary of the formal contractual model can be demonstrated as follows; 
Δ FCA    =   .531 +1.352ENVU + 1.583BUDEP -2.6BUDEPXENVU 
Δ BUASP 
5. Discussion  
Correlation analysis in Table3 indicated formal contractual agreement to be negatively correlated with buyer 
dependence. These results were confirmed in the regression model (table 1). From the regression model from Table 
2 we can also see that buyer dependence by itself does not lead to formal contractual agreement, but the interaction 
effect between dependence and asset specificity was the one which determined formal contractual agreement. These 
findings on negative effect of buyer dependence on formal contractual agreement are consistent with Casciaro and 
Piskorski (2005) argument that of resistance from dominant partner in engaging contractual agreement when there is 
inbalance. Contracts are not seen to be the key solution to problems facing exchange partners (Buvik & Grønhaug, 
2000), but to extent that there is dependence and asset specificity deployment there will be a need for such 
formalization. When buying firm is dependent on the supplying firm, the vulnerability increases and the buying firm 
will be in more disadvantage side. A tentative explanation could be that buyer dependence does not primarily stem 
from specific investments. In a Tanzanian setting, dependency could reflect lack of alternative suppliers. These 
findings are partly consistent with other studies which were conducted in developed economies. For example Buvik 
and Reve (2002) found a positive association of specific investment on formal contractual agreement, but the effect 
was contingent on buyer dependence. Nakhla (2003) and Ivens (2005) found environmental uncertainty to have a 
negative impact on formal contractual agreements. This study indicates a negative relationship between formal 
contractual agreement and environmental uncertainty (H3) but was not significant (partially supported). Lack of 
significant findings on H3 does not indicate a contradiction with current theoretical literature because the direction 
of relationship was the same. The significant support is partly limited by sample and other methodological issues 
which could be addressed in other studies.    
6. Study Limitation 
This study acts an exploratory finding because of sample limitation. The study has not includded other variables 
such as cultural and institution. Such variables could help in explaining the way that Transaction cost is shaped from 
Africa context. I suggest future studies to address these limitations for better findings. The model which was used in 
regression analysis did not use alterntive models.The regression model used only the hypothesized variables and 
their interaction without including other controls. This has been partly influenced by theoretical assumption on the 
influence of these variables.The use of these findings should take account of these limitations.  
7. Conclusion and Implications 
This study was done in a developing country (Tanzania) where the institutional framework and business culture and 
practices do differ significantly from western countries. The major findings from the Tanzanian business-to business 
relationships do however coincide with previous studies from western countries. These prelimenarily findings 
suggests that the firms from western countries looking for possible outsourcing to firms in Tanzania can still draw 
upon current Transaction based theoretical assumption but this should be contingent upon issues like culture, and 
institutions.  
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Table 1. Summary of the measures  
CONSTRUCT ITEMS (Measured in 7-points likert Scale) 
Formal Contractual Agreements 
(FCA) 
λ2 =117.283  p < .01 
α = 81.5% 
KMO = .648 
Firm agreements stipulate all aspects concerning exchange of information 
about price and market conditions between our firms; Written contracts 
stipulate all aspects regarding the tasks and influence of two parties in the 
quality control of the product we purchase from this supplier; Written 
contracts stipulate all aspect regarding the order selection of sub-suppliers 
for the product we order from this supplier. 
Sourced from Buvik & Reve (2002) 
Buyer dependence (BUDEP) 
λ2 =507.724   p < .01 
α = 96.98% 
KMO = .854 
If we decide to stop purchasing from this supplier, we could easily replace 
this volume with purchase from another supplier; There are many 
competitive suppliers of this product; Our firm will not have difficulties in 
using product from another supplier; Changing to another to another 
supplier will require us less effort and cost 
Adopted from Heide (1994), Buvik & Reve (2002 Kaufmann and Stern 
(1988). 
Buyer Asset specificity (BUASP)  
λ2 =501.174   p < .01 
α = 93.35% 
KMO = .796,  
We have made significant investment in equipment dedicated to our 
relationship with this supplier; We have made extensive internal 
adjustments in order to deal effectively with this supplier; Training our 
people to deal with this supplier has involved substantial commitments of 
time and money: Our logistics system have been tailored to meet the 
requirements of dealing with this supplier  
Adopted from Anderson (1985) and Stump and Heide (1996) 
Environmental Uncertainty (EU) 
λ2 =417.069   p < .01 
α = 82.78% 
KMO = .859 
Demand for this product varies continually; Our most important 
competitors are regularly carrying out product adjustment; Product we are 
purchasing from this supplier have high innovation rate and varies 
continually. 
Sourced from; Rindfleisch & Heide (1997:42) Buvik and John (2000) 
Noordiwier et al (1990) and Anderson (1985) 
The table above indicates the summary of constructs used and all the items used in each constrcut. Table also gives the information about 
reliability and the strength of each construct. 
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Table 2. Regression analysiss  
Dependent variable: Formal contractual agreement 
Variables Unstandardized coefficients Standardized
coefficients 
t-values  p values 
(one-tail) 
Constant 3.764  1.89  0.03 
 BUASP 0.531 0.171 1.77 0.04 
 
H1 BUDEP -0.360 -0.368 -3.75    <0.01 
H3 ENVU -0.169 -0,098 -1.05 0.15 
(BUASPXENVU) 1.352 2.424 1.781 0.037 
H2(BUASPXBUDEP) 1.585 2.617 1.801 0.037 
(BUASPXBUDEPX 
ENVU) 
-2.68 - 2.496 -1.749 0.042 
Model Fit             F(3, 90)= 5.23 
R2Adj = .205 
P < .001 
    
The table above provides information about ordinary least square regression analysis results with coefficients, corresponding p values and the 
model fitness.  
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
This table gives a correlation matrix for all variables used and their corresonding mean and standard deviations. Following are meanings of the 
abbreviations used; 
FCA    = Formal contractual agreements  
BUASP    = Buyer asset specificity 
ENVU   = Environmental uncertainty 
BUDEP    = Buyer dependence 
BUASPXENVU   = Interaction of buyer asset specificity and environmental uncertainty    
BUASPXBUDEP = Interaction of buyer asset specificity and buyer dependence 






 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FCA 1 .29** -.44** -.17 .31**  .36** .36** 
BUASP  1 -.33** -.019 .97** .92** .89** 
BUDEP   1 .193 -.33** -.49** -.49** 
ENVU    1 -.176 -.054 -.203* 
(BUASPXENU)     1 -.90** .921** 
(BUASPXBUDEP)      1 .975** 
(BUASPXENVUXBUDEP)       1 
Mean 4.25 -.39 4.39 5.37 -2.10 -1.97 -10.73 
Standard 
deviation 
1.57 .503 1.605 .905 2.801 2.586 14.588 
